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ABSTRACT
As the shortcomings of our current Internet become more
and more obvious, researchers have started creating alterna-
tive approaches for the Internet of the future. Their design
goals are mainly content-orientation, security, support for
mobility and cloud computing. The probably most popular
architecture is called Content Centric Networking. Every
communication is treated as a distribution of content and
caches are used within the network to improve the effec-
tiveness. While the performance gain of Content Centric
Networks is undoubted, there are questions about security
and especially privacy since it is not one of its main design
principle. In this work, we compare the Content Centric
Networking approach with the current Internet with respect
to security and privacy. We analyze improvements that have
been made and new problems that have yet to be resolved.
The Internet of the future could be content-oriented, so it
is essential to identify potential security and privacy issues
that are inherent to the architecture early on.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network
Architecture and Design—Store and Forward Networks
General Terms
Security
Keywords
Future Internet Architecture, Content Centric Networking,
Privacy, Censorship Circumvention
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginnings of the Internet, the world has changed
a lot. Back then, all computers were stationary and used
mainly by scientists who trusted each other. The computers
themselves had scarce resources and their Internet connec-
tions were very slow. The situation is mirrored in the paper
by David Clark [21] from 1988 in which he describes the
design philosophy of the current Internet. The top goals in-
clude fault tolerance, flexibility to allow different kinds of
communications and inclusion of a variety of networks. Re-
gardless of the extent to which these and other goals were
achieved, we can conclude that the main design principles
do not correspond to today’s requirements. As a conse-
quence, it is not surprising that we can observe a lack of
security, privacy, support for mobility and efficiency among
other shortcomings. Even though a lot of work has focused
on adding these desired features, e.g. with encryption and
new protocols to handle mobility, inherent problems of the
architecture can only be overcome to a certain degree. For
many years, researchers all over the world have tried to find
new clean-slate architectures to replace the current Internet
at some point in the future. Specifically, the NSF-funded
projects Future Internet Design (FIND), Future Internet Ar-
chitecture (FIA) [4] and FIA - Next Phase (FIA-NP) aim at
designing the next-generation Internet. After a multitude of
ongoing sub-projects in the early phases, FIA-NP includes
only the three most promising remaining approaches: Mobil-
ityFirst [2], eXpressive Internet Architecture (XIA) [5] and
Named Data Networking (NDN) [3].
As the name suggests, MobilityFirst focuses on support for
mobility at a time when the majority of devices are mobile.
It uses a highly scalable Global Name System for name res-
olution. XIA aims at accommodating a variety of network
services and being flexible enough for new innovations of the
future. NDN is based on the Open Source project CCNx,
which implements the idea of a Content Centric Network.
Most communications on the Internet nowadays have the
goal of retrieving content, and others can be modelled as
an exchange of content. Since popular content is requested
frequently, Content Centric Networks involve routers with
integrated caches to improve the scalability.
All of the three projects state improved and inherent secu-
rity as a primary objective. What they really mean is veri-
fiable integrity of communications. Other security problems
that already exist in the current Internet are not necessar-
ily solved and there are even new security vulnerabilities.
Apart from that, none of the research groups declared pri-
vacy as a main design objective. It is logical that this can
have consequences for users.
In this paper, we focus on the content-oriented approach
taken by NDN, the most popular project with the largest
research community. We first describe the architecture of a
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content-oriented Internet in Section 2. Afterwards, we com-
pare the current Internet with Content Centric Networks
with respect to security and privacy. Section 3 describes
what remains unchanged before Sections 4 and 5 examine
benefits and challenges of Content Centric Networking. Fi-
nally, Section 6 gives an overview of related research followed
by a conclusion.
2. CONTENT CENTRIC NETWORKING
The idea behind Content Centric Networking is to adapt the
messages sent over the Internet to what they really are: con-
tent. Instead of of the restriction to end-to-end communi-
cations between pairs of users, Content Centric Networking
allows for much more flexible and efficient message exchange.
The main principle is that everything is content. In contrast
to the current Internet’s push model, Content Centric Net-
working uses a pull communication model. If a host wants
to see a specific piece of content, he can simply request it by
its name. In both CCNx and NDN, content names are hier-
archical, e.g. /umass/cs/cs660/student/report. In theory,
flat naming could have been used instead, but that requires
a name resolution. A discussion of benefits and problems of
hierarchical and flat naming goes beyond the scope of this
paper. The hierarchical content name is sent as a so-called
interest to the next router. Routers communicate with each
other by sending name prefixes that they can serve. This
is similar to routing based on IP prefixes in the current In-
ternet. Before forwarding the interest to the next router,
every router will first check whether the queried content is
in its cache. If no router has the content in its cache, the
interest is forwarded all the way until it arrives at the con-
tent provider. He will send the name of the content, the
content itself and his signature back. The signature is just
the hash of the name and content, h(name, content), en-
crypted with the provider’s private key. It allows the recip-
ient to verify data and source integrity. For that, he needs
to hash the name and content himself, decrypt the signa-
ture with the provider’s public key and compare the them.
This verification step is necessary, because hosts will often
receive content from a cache instead of the content provider.
An example scenario is shown in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Compared to the current Internet, routers are very differ-
ent. They basically contain three tables: the cache, the
Pending Interest Table (PIT) and the Forward Information
Base (FIB). Based on their cache replacement policy routers
decide to cache content that is forwarded through them or
not. The PIT registers every interest that the router receives
and the interface from where it arrived. By looking up the
name in the FIB, which maps name prefixes to outgoing in-
terfaces, the router finds out where to forward interests if
they are not cached. The way the FIB is used is very simi-
lar to longest prefix matching of IP prefixes in routers of the
current Internet. Routers communicate with each other to
fill and update the FIB. Apart from reducing the network
congestion by returning cached content, routers also aggre-
gate interests. If multiple interests for the same content ar-
rive before the router receives the content, it only forwards
the first interests and keeps all requesting interfaces in the
PIT. Once the content arrives, it is forwarded to all of the re-
questing interfaces. This illustrates how multicast routing is
possible without additional effort. In general, routers drop
all interests from the PIT after the content is forwarded.
Figure 1: An example of Content Centric Network-
ing1 (1). Two hosts are on the left, two content
providers on the right. The routers in the network
have caches.
Figure 2: An example of Content Centric Network-
ing1 (2). The host in the bottom left corner re-
quested content from the content provider in the
top right corner. None of the routers between them
had the content cached, so the interest is forwarded.
If the content does not arrive due to loss, the interest will
be dropped after a timeout. In Sections 4 and 5, we will
describe the consequences this design has on security and
privacy.
The content itself can be sent in the clear or encrypted. In
order to allow for scalable communication, the names should
not be encrypted at least for popular content in order to al-
low for the use of caching. If the names are encrypted, the
requesting user will not know the name for which to query
unless he knows the secret encryption key. We discuss this
issue in greater detail in Section 5.
3. UNCHANGED SECURITY AND PRIVACY
COMPARED TO CURRENT INTERNET
Even though the architecture is different from the current
Internet, some problems have not been solved. Several of
them have to do with censorship. Censorship Circumven-
tion - or more generally privacy - is not defined as a primary
design principle of Content Centric Networks, so additional
techniques will have to be built on top of the architecture
to support it. Firstly, the content provider is still easily
identifiable. While it is possible to do this through his IP
address in the current Internet, Content Centric Networking
1The pictures used for this graphic are from wikimedia.org
and wikipedia.org. They are referenced at the end of this
document.
Figure 3: An example of Content Centric Network-
ing1 (3). The content provider returned the re-
quested content and name signed with his signa-
ture. The content is forwarded backwards in the
same path the interest came. The routers can cache
the content or not dependent on their cache replace-
ment policy.
Figure 4: An example of Content Centric Network-
ing1 (4). Another user requests the same piece of
content that is already stored close by in a router’s
cache.
Figure 5: An example of Content Centric Network-
ing1 (5). The router recognizes the content name as
cached content and returns it.
forces him to sign every piece of content with this signature.
As a consequence, censors can check whether arriving con-
tent is coming from an unwanted source and possibly filter
it. We will look into this problem in Section 5.4. Secondly,
censors are currently able to block known Tor relays and
proactively probe hosts in order to find out whether they
are Tor bridges. If they suspect a host, they can simply
behave as if they were a benign user and try to access Tor
through the bridge. If it works, they have identified a Tor
bridge. In Content Centric Networks, anonymity networks
are also conceivable. Section 5.8 examines existing solutions
such as ANDa¯NA. Similarly to Tor, ANDa¯NA’s relays can
be blocked by censors. To our knowledge, bridges have not
been proposed yet, but they could be tested similarly to
proactive probing for Tor bridges. Thirdly, censors can fil-
ter interests for banned keywords or prefixes in names. Fur-
ther techniques like Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) are also
applicable. Finally, trusted third parties like Certification
Authorities (CA) in the current Internet will still be neces-
sary. Even though every piece of content has to be signed
by the publisher, the recipient needs a trusted third party
delivering the public key in order to be able to verify the
integrity of the content.
4. SECURITY AND PRIVACY BENEFITS OF
CONTENT CENTRIC NETWORKS
In the following, we describe how the users’ security and pri-
vacy benefit from the Content Centric Networking architec-
ture. This includes verifiable integrity with signed content,
the absence of addresses in interests, abandonment of name
resolution in favor of hierarchical names and a certain degree
of protection against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
4.1 Verifiable Integrity
As described in Section 2, it is mandatory for content provi-
ders to sign the content and name with their private key.
Therefore, the recipient can verify the integrity of data and
source. This prevents spoofing as it is possible in the current
Internet. A positive side-effect of it is Routing Security. As
every other piece of content, communication between routers
has to be signed. This prevents adversaries from influencing
the routing tables, i.e. the FIB in Content Centric Networks.
4.2 Absence of Addresses
Content Centric Networking abandons addresses totally. Nei-
ther interests nor the content delivery messages contain ad-
dresses. Interests in Content Centric Networks contain only
the name of the requested content, but not who requested
it. Only the first forwarding router knows the interface from
which the content was requested. All other routers only
know the previous router on the forwarding path. When
the content provider returns the content, his message also
includes the content name, his signature, the publisher’s ID
and information about where to retrieve the publisher’s pub-
lic key. As a result, there is no necessity for addresses,
although the publisher can be inferred from the ID and
the key. From a privacy perspective, this design improves
anonymity because the source of an interest is unknown or
at least hard to find out. In Section 5.2, we explain various
techniques with which an adversary can still find out who
sent the interest.
But the different communication paradigm has even more
advantages. In the current Internet, many attacks require
the attacker to directly send messages to the victim. In
Content Centric Networks the victim has no address, so this
threat is completely mitigated because no content can arrive
at a host without the host requesting the content in advance.
It is slightly different for content publishers. This case will
be examined in the next section.
4.3 Protection against Denial of Service
Apart from the protection against direct attacks on hosts,
Content Centric Networking even offers a protection against
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on content providers. As-
sume an attacker launches a DoS attack on a publisher by
sending lots of interests. These are simply collected at the
first router and only one interest is forwarded. Even if the
attacker controls a large botnet that is distributed over many
locations that do not share routers on the routing path to
the publisher, interest aggregation mitigates most of the at-
tack. What actually happened is a shift in the point of
attack from the content provider to the routers. Instead of
flooding the publisher, the attack fills routers’ Pending In-
terest Tables. We discuss this new DoS attack and possible
coutermeasures in Section 5.1. Although neither NDN nor
CCNx include this feature, some researchers have suggested
adding a flag to interests that indicates that the interest
should be routed to the content provider without returning
cached content. Such a flag allows attackers to directly flood
the publishers again.
4.4 Name Resolution
Content Centric Networks are based on hierarchical names
and therefore do not require explicit name resolution. In the
current Internet, name resolution is provided by DNS and
offers a multitude of possibilities for attackers to exploit, e.g.
DNS hijacking. If flat names are used instead, the advantage
is lost.
5. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CHALLENGES
OF CONTENT CENTRIC NETWORKS
Even though there are security and privacy aspects that im-
prove with Content Centric Networking, it also poses new
challenges. In this section, we outline several of these con-
cerns and suggest possible solutions. We start with Interest
Flooding Attacks, the most studied attack on Content Cen-
tric Networks and go on to describe less known and privacy-
related problems.
5.1 Interest Flooding Attacks
As explained in Section 4.3, DoS attacks in Content Centric
Networks will target routers instead of content providers.
For that reason, they are called Interest Flooding Attacks
(IFA). They have been the subject of many research pa-
pers over the last few years. In this section, we describe
the problem in general and a few simple countermeasures.
For an overview of more sophisticated countermeasures, we
refer to Section 6. To carry out an IFA, an attacker needs
to sends lots of interests. If the interests are all for the
same piece of content, the first router aggregates the inter-
ests in its PIT. As soon as the number of pending interests
surpasses the PIT capacity, the router drops or rejects in-
terests. The denial of service on the first router works at
least until the content actually arrives at the router and the
requests can be answered. Effectively, the attacker just de-
graded his own local network’s performance by flooding the
router. If a router closer to the core or close to a specific
content provider is the target, the attacker adapts the at-
tack to include various different interests for content by the
same publisher. Using different content names helps against
interest aggregation. Ideally, the attacker controls a botnet
that is distributed over many places, such that interest ag-
gregation does not take place too early. Some routers then
become bottlenecks for interests, resulting in the same sit-
uation as before, albeit at different routers. The situation
becomes even more troubling if the attacker controls a re-
mote content source. He could make the source answer very
slowly on purpose to delay the content, while at the same
time filling up the PIT with interests.
There is a relatively simple countermeasure used in NDN.
Routers could keep track of the number of interests per do-
main and drop some of them if there are too many in one
specific domain. Against an IFA, this is an effective strat-
egy, but also has some issues. If there is a very popular
event, e.g. the Superbowl, that most people watch, and the
router starts dropping the interests, this is actually coun-
terproductive. Of course, this also applies to all kinds of
popular content. In fact, it allows the attacker to selectively
block certain content by sending lots of requests. Most of
his interests are dropped, but the same applies to legitimate
hosts.
Depending on the configuration of the routers, they might
verify the integrity of the content themselves. This involves
expensive operations that can slow down the router. Espe-
cially in a scenario with a botnet and a cooperating content
provider, the routers’ speed could be reduced. In order to
handle high load situations, routers could stop verification
as soon as it becomes a burden for their forwarding speed.
Similarly, an adversary could try to degrade the network
performance by filling the cache with arbitrary data. This
is called cache pollution. Again, this works best with a coop-
erating content provider delivering the content and a botnet
requesting it. The attack basically works with any kind of
content that is not of any use to other hosts. Such a scenario
is detectable by comparing cache hit rates. If only the same
people request the content over and over again and nobody
else is interested in it, it is very likely a cache pollution at-
tack. It is more difficult to defend against such an attack.
Countermeasures include blacklisting the cooperating source
provider such that its content is not cached any more and
ignoring the interests of recognized bots for caching or even
completely.
5.2 Cache Privacy
The main privacy concern in Content Centric Networks is
caching. Having a copy of my communications stored in
caches that are available to everybody who knows how to
query it is a risk. In the current Internet, adversaries have
to sniff on traffic exactly at the time it is sent, because there
are supposed to be no traces of the actual content. This is
substantially harder than being allowed to query the mes-
sages by name and even some time after they were sent. As
a consequence, the use of caches causes a tradeoff between
privacy and efficiency. In the following, we will examine at-
tacks and possible countermeasures.
There are basically three attack scenarios as identified by
Lauinger [41] and Acs et al. [7]:
• Cache Enumeration
• Timing Attack
• Conversation Cloning
For each of them, an adversary simply needs to be in the
same local network as the victim such that they share a
cache. None of the attacks actually involve illegally sniff-
ing on other people’s traffic. Instead, attackers can simply
request items from the caches like any legitimate user.
5.2.1 Cache Enumeration
There are mainly two reasons why someone might want to
enumerate a cache. If the cache population, i.e. the peo-
ple who share a cache, is small, it could be possible to infer
who has requested specific content just by looking at all
cached content. In many cases, the name of the content
will involve some user-specific part, e.g. /provider/mail/
username, that immediately gives away the identity of the
requesting person. In addition to that, the signature of the
content source could be enough to infer the communication
partner. For censors, it might even be sufficient to find out
that someone queried specific content. Otherwise, finding
out which content is in the cache is a first step before a
Timing Attack or cloning a conversation.
The feasibility of Cache Enumeration arises from routers al-
lowing users to either directly request all cached data, e.g.
with a command like ccnls in CCNx, or by using a combi-
nation of prefix matching and the exclude functionality of
NDN as explained by Lauinger et al. [42]. Prefix matching is
performed on every query, so if the cache includes /email/
work/2015 and /email/private/2015 and the adversary re-
quests /, an arbitrary cached content is returned because
all entries match. Then, the exclude functionality is used
to query again excluding the first content name. While this
may take lots of requests for a large cache, the distance to
the cache is very small. Still, it is unlikely that the attacker
will get a consistent view of the cache.
5.2.2 Timing Attack
Timing Attacks aim at finding out if and when a user re-
quested a specific piece of content. The adversary can mea-
sure the time it takes for the content to arrive and com-
pare it to previously measured times to find out whether
his request resulted in a cache hit or not. Therefore, mea-
suring round-trip-times is a preliminary step for a Timing
Attack. It also requires the attacker to know in advance
which content the user might query. Censors, for example,
could have a number of blacklisted files and check whether
a user requested them. But even local adversaries with lim-
ited resources can execute such an attack to spy on people
within the same cache population. Lauinger et al. [42] de-
scribe how Timing Attacks can be carried out invasively and
non-invasively. Here, invasive means that the cache treats a
request as any other request and possibly updates its state,
while a non-invasive request would not influence the cache’s
state and simply retrieve the cache’s content. Which method
is chosen depends solely on the cache itself and whether it al-
lows non-invasive queries. Disallowing them makes it harder
for the adversary, although not impossible. In the invasive
scenario, the attack depends on the cache replacement pol-
icy. For example in the case of FIFO (First In First Out),
LRU (Least Recently Used) or Random Replacement, the
attacker first needs to find out the cache lifetime or char-
acteristic time tc of the cache, i.e. the expected time for
which the cache stores a piece of content. For LRU, it is
the time a file remains in the cache while not being queried.
The attacker can then repeatedly request the content every
tc+ time units for a small . If he gets a cache hit, someone
within the cache population queried the content within the
last interval. Especially if a user-specific content name is
used, the attacker knows who requested the content. Since
the characteristic time is determined as an expected value,
the attacker will get a result that is true only with a cer-
tain confidence. Another problem for the adversary is that
the targeted user could request the content shortly after the
attacker, i.e. within  time units, and the request would
therefore not be detected. CCN offers a way to overcome
this, though: Every cached content is stored as chunks of
4KB which can individually be requested. The attackers
can thus iterate over the chunks of the given content and
query one of them every tc time units. Lauinger et al. [42]
call this Parallel Cache Probing. It is important to notice
that these methods are dependent on the cache replacement
strategy. With a more complex method using randomness
it could become infeasible for a local adversary to launch a
Timing Attack. For example, in order to understand which
content is cached, one might have to observe all requests at
a router. This could restrict this attack to more powerful
adversaries like a censoring country which might have access
to the router anyway and will not use this method.
5.2.3 Conversation Cloning
The idea behind Conversation Cloning is that an attacker
tries to get the whole content corresponding to a data flow.
This flow could, for example, be a video call using Voice-
over-CCN (VoCCN) [37]. The content itself is assumed to
be encrypted. But by reassembling the messages of the con-
versation, the adversary could potentially find a side chan-
nel and infer privacy-related information about the content.
Possible side channels include the size of the messages and
their timings. A similar attack is possible on VoIP [55], so
it is likely to be a threat for VoCCN, too.
Somehow, adversaries need to find out about the names that
are used in the data flow. It is likely to have some kind
of serial number, e.g. /voccn/call/alice/1, followed by
/voccn/call/alice/2 and so on. With the previously dis-
cussed Cache Enumeration, the attacker can easily find out
about a current sequence number and possibly the naming
scheme. This enables him to predict names of future mes-
sages and to request and receive the messages in real-time
like the legitimate receiver. As discussed in the next sec-
tion, the naming issue can be overcome by encrypting parts
of the names or even the whole name. If the attacker is
not able to retrieve the content in the right order, he is at
a significant disadvantage, because he can not infer the or-
der from the content itself as it is encrypted. The main
problem is still that Cache Enumeration is possible in the
first place. Using the exclude functionality, every message
with the known routing prefix /voccn/call/alice/ can be
queried by attacker.
5.2.4 Countermeasures
This section contains a list of possible countermeasures against
the previously described attacks. They include - but are not
limited to - the work of Lauinger [41], Lauinger et al. [43,
42], Chaabane et al. [18], Acs et al. [7]. Most of them affect
the efficiency. As a result, we get a trade-off between privacy
and efficiency.
1. Disallow caching in general. This eliminates one of the
main benefits of Content Centric Networks.
2. Disallow non-invasive queries, i.e. a query should al-
ways affect the cache’s state and not just allow users
to enumerate the contents without changing the state.
3. Disallow techniques that are used for Cache Enumer-
ation, such as ccnls. In the context of DNS Snooping
such requests are often called non-recursive.
4. Restrict or completely disallow the exclude function-
ality of caches.
5. Disallow requesting chunks of a piece of content to pre-
vent Parallel Cache Probing.
6. Encrypt names in interactive conversations. Encryp-
tion prevents the adversary from predicting names.
The content is not meant for people who do not know
about the naming scheme anyway. Therefore, the effi-
ciency of the network is not degraded.
7. Tunnel traffic using an anonymity system. This has
basically the same effect on Cache Privacy as Encryp-
tion. ANDa¯NA [27] is an example of such an anonymity
system.
8. Use a more complex cache replacement policy. The
Timing Attacks rely on knowledge about the cache
lifetime. If the cache uses a complex strategy, the at-
tacker has a harder time understanding it. Attacks
based on the cache lifetime might not be possible at
all any more.
9. Only cache popular content. Popular content is re-
quested often and by multiple people. This can be
enforced with a cache replacement policy that adapts
to the content that is forwarded by the router. Current
research is focusing on such topics.
10. Make cache lifetimes very short. This limits the time
for adversaries to retrieve the requested content, but
at the same time affects the performance.
11. Choose cache lifetime randomly for each cached file to
prevent attackers from measuring the cache’s charac-
teristic time.
12. Increase the anonymity set, i.e. the cache population.
This results in more people being served by the same
cache and thus in reduced efficiency.
13. Add a minimum response delay in case of a cache hit.
The actual delay could be chosen randomly in order
to prevent attackers from measuring the minimum re-
sponse delay. It obviously increases the total delay,
but if chosen carefully the adversary can not distin-
guish whether the content was cached in the closest
cache or several hops away.
14. Do not cache private content. This is similar to only
caching popular content, but instead identifying con-
tent that should not be cached. The key observa-
tion is that private content should only ever be re-
ceived by the communicating parties and caching it
will neither improve their privacy nor the overall per-
formance of the network, because nobody else can pos-
sibly legitimately want the content. Based on this,
Lauinger et al. [43, 42] propose selective countermea-
sures, i.e. countermeasures that are only applied to
privacy-related content. One way to implement this is
by using a do-not-cache flag in interests. But privacy-
aware users might decide to use it on all their interests,
so it might be better to have the content origin set the
do-not-cache flag. The disadvantage of this option is
that the receiver has no choice. Furthermore, caches
of routers on the return path could simply decide to
ignore the flag and still cache the content.
Apart from these countermeasures, it might already be enough
to detect attacks on Cache Privacy. If an attacker is identi-
fied, his requests could be ignored partially or completely to
resolve the situation. The detection is unfortunately not
easy and prone to finding false positives. The detection
methods include the following:
1. Edge routers keep track track of how often the same
content is queried from a single interface. If periodic
querying occurs, it is assumed to be a Timing Attack
or Cache Enumeration.
2. Edge routers remember the recent hit rate for each
interface. If an unusually high hit rate is detected, it
is likely because of Cache Enumeration.
3. Edge routers keep track of requests using the exclude
functionality. As a consequence, they can find out if
somebody is trying to clone the conversation.
All these methods should be deployed as close to the users
as possible. Still, all of them are suboptimal. Firstly, peri-
odic querying might be necessary in a company that wants to
know the state of some content. For example, a news agency
always has to know whether it is missing a story that an-
other agency has already put on their website. Secondly, a
high hit rate could be accidental. For example, if multiple
people are watching the same movie, but they did not start
exactly at the same time, there will be lots of cache hits re-
sulting in false positives. Thirdly, the exclude functionality
can be used in a legitimate way. If a user makes extensive
use of it, he could falsely be detected as an attacker.
5.3 Name Privacy
With a content-oriented architecture, the performance ben-
efits come from having a publicly known and often human-
readable name for the content and thus being able to match
requested content names to cached content and to aggregate
interests. But users sacrifice their privacy for using these
names. Assume that a user lives in a censoring country and
wants to look at blocked content. Retrieving the content
with its human-readable name is impossible, because the
censors can filter out unwanted names. If the content were
already cached at the time the censors decide to block it,
they could simply delete content with the given name from
all caches. A powerful adversary could even store interests to
analyze them later. Caches allow censors to find unwanted
content even after it is sent. Even for privacy-aware users
that do not want anybody to track their interests it is not
desirable to send names in the clear. As a result, Name Pri-
vacy is a challenge in Content Centric Networking.
There are conceivable countermeasures, some of which are
inspired by techniques used in the current Internet.
1. Encrypt content names. If only the last part of the
name is encrypted, e.g. /provider’/mail’/username’/
a2e13f7b5, there is still a fairly good chance to guess
what the content is. Encrypting the whole name would
result in routing problems because the hierarchical struc-
ture is not used any more. Instead, a part of the
name should be encrypted, e.g. /provider’/mail’/
c298a67fe’/a2e13f7b5. The encryption can not be
extended over the name of the provider, because the
interest would not arrive there due to a non-matching
name prefix. In many cases, though, censors will com-
pletely block a provider. We conclude that the hierar-
chy of names helps censors distinguish between benign
and unwanted content. As a consequence, encryption
of names is only a viable option for increased privacy,
but not sufficient for censorship circumvention. It is
worth noting that the encryption has to be negoti-
ated before the interest and that advantages of Content
Centric Networks such as caching are lost.
2. Decoy Routing. Decoy Routing is essentially redirect-
ing traffic once it is out of the reach of a censor. As
effective as it is, Decoy Routing would require archi-
tectural changes. For a comprehensive description and
analysis, we refer to [39, 36].
3. Change names. To circumvent censors’ blacklist of
names, one could simply change the name in order to
make it seem to the censor as if the content is normal
and should not be filtered out. The problem is that the
censors are likely to get suspicious if a content provider
that is known for producing unwanted content sud-
denly offers lots of unblocked content. To check the
assumption, they can query the content themselves.
Furthermore, suspicious content providers are likely to
be completely blocked by censors anyway. Therefore,
changing names is at least not a permanent solution
to censorship circumvention.
4. Ephemeral names. The idea is to generate new names
for blocked content. Users should be able to predict
the names while censors should not. This could maybe
be achieved by having a separate generation algorithm
for every user. In any case, with ephemeral names the
benefits of the content-oriented architecture are lost.
5. Anonymity Systems. Relaying encrypted traffic through
multiple other nodes is certainly an option, although
again the advantages of Content Centric Networking
are not used. An anonymity system similar to Tor in
the current Internet is ANDa¯NA. We describe ANDa¯NA
in Section 5.9
All in all, there is no perfect solution so far. This will surely
be addressed by researchers.
5.4 Signature Privacy
While we previously stated that integrity verification is a
benefit of Content Centric Networking, it also provides prob-
lems. Content providers are identifiable by their signature,
so censors can block content if they recognize an unwanted
publisher. To mitigate this risk, we suggest two countermea-
sures.
1. Group or ring signatures. A number of content providers
share a group signature. This can be administrated by
a group manager (group signatures) or through inter-
action of the group members (ring signature). If a
publisher whose content is filtered out by censors uses
a group signature that he shares with a number of un-
blocked and popular publishers, there is a chance the
censors will not block his content any more. Otherwise,
the censors risk losing the services of the other popu-
lar publishers as well. It is unclear, though, whether
popular services would take the risk of getting blocked
themselves without incentives. There has been lots of
research on group signatures that we recommend for
more information, specifically [19, 16, 14, 17].
2. Ephemeral identities. A content provider could gen-
erate ephemeral identities for every piece of content.
With a signature that is unknown to the censor, the
content could go unblocked. Even if the censor decides
to check the origin of the content, it would at least af-
fect the performance of the censors network and add
expensive computations. Whether or not censors are
willing to do this remains to be seen.
3. Proxies. Instead of ephemeral identities, proxies could
be used. The signature then becomes the signature
of the proxy. If a proxy is used for unwanted content
frequently, censor will eventually block the proxy’s for-
warded content.
All the proposed solutions seem promising. The effects are
all speculative, though, until they are actually used in a
real-world scenario.
5.5 Content Privacy / Access Control
As in the current Internet, access control is enforced by con-
tent providers through encryption. This becomes even more
important since their content might not even be coming di-
rectly from the publisher, but from a cache. If the encryp-
tion is specific to one user, the effect of caching is nulli-
fied. Therefore, Fiat et al. [30] propose broadcast encryp-
tion which allows n users with different keys to decrypt the
same encrypted content. While this allows effective caching,
this method produces keys of length O(√n) and increases
the length of the encrypted content by a factor O(√n). A
different solution is atomic proxy cryptography offered by
Blaze et al [15]. The content provider encrypts content such
that the first user can decrypt it and provides a proxy with
a re-encryption key. The proxy has no knowledge about
the content and simply applies the key and delivers the re-
encrypted content to the second user, re-encrypts for the
third user etc. The main problem of atomic proxy cryptog-
raphy is the use of asymmetric keys that require computa-
tionally expensive operations.
5.6 Accountability
The previously claimed advantage of having no addresses
can be a problem. Law enforcement, for example, has to
be able to trace back who requested illegal content. There
are basically two outcomes: Either law enforcement is given
access to the whole infrastructure such that they can keep
track of interests in illegal content, or not. If not, users
can not be held accountable for requesting illegal content.
This aspect of Content Centric Networking has barely been
studied, but is of great importance from a legal perspective.
5.7 Revocation and Removal
There are many reasons why somebody would like content
to be remove content from caches:
• Revocation. Content can become outdated, especially
if hosts repeatedly request the same piece of content
and it has been in the cache for a long time. Content
providers need a mechanism to either update or at least
revoke outdated content.
• Content Poisoning. Fake content is in the cache and
should be removed. Ghali et al. [33] examine this in
detail. Basically, content poisoning occurs when the
signature is invalid or not verifiable. An adversary can
try to distribute the fake copy of content. This prob-
lem can easily be mitigated by having routers verify
signatures, but - as discussed earlier - this causes the
routers to perform expensive computations.
• Cache Pollution. This attack is discussed in Section 5.1.
An attacker tries to fill the cache with arbitrary data
to degrade the network’s performance.
• Illegal content removal. Criminals might try to keep
illegal data in a cache by repeatedly querying it. The
availability of illegal data within the network infras-
tructure is not acceptable, so there should be a removal
mechanism.
While there are more sophisticated countermeasures, we re-
strict the following list to general purpose measures that
achieve the content removal:
1. Explicit Removal. The service provider owning the
cache could manually access and remove content. As-
suming a large number of such cases, this method is
infeasible.
2. Blacklist broadcasting. If the detection of unwanted
content is automated, a blacklist of content names
could be created that is broadcasted among routers.
If a router receives the list, it deletes all cached con-
tent that is present in the blacklist. The broadcast
messages cause a large communication overhead.
3. Periodic revalidation. Routers periodically verify that
the cached content is still up-to-date. Like the previous
approaches, periodic revalidation imposes a communi-
cation overhead for the routers.
There is certainly more research to be done on content re-
moval from caches, because the described methods all have
issues. Previous research has mainly aimed at detecting un-
wanted content before it is stored at all, but there need to
be mechanisms to remove content that is not detected or
identified as illegal later.
5.8 Privacy Enhancing Technologies for Con-
tent Centric Networking
There are many Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) for
current Internet, but it has yet to be checked which are ap-
plicable to Content Centric Networking. Also, there might
be new techniques conceivable. In this section, we present
ANDa¯NA, which is to our knowledge the only currently ex-
isting anonymizing system for NDN.
5.9 ANDaNA
ANDa¯NA [27] is an attempt to build Tor [29] for NDN. It is
designed as an overlay network on top of the NDN architec-
ture. Important elements of Tor were used, such as Onion
Routing. The goal of ANDa¯NA is to provide anonymity
through layered encryption. The assumption is that there is
no adversary with the power of global surveillance. Under
that assumption, traffic is relayed twice through so-called
anonymizing routers (AR) which are hosts or routers dis-
tributed all over the world. Each AR adds another layer of
encryption. Compared to Tor, only two relays are necessary
to achieve the same degree of anonymity. This is due to the
absence of addresses in Content Centric Networking. The
first step in a communication through ANDa¯NA is building
an ephemeral circuit. It is used for only one interest and
closed afterwards. For that, the user distributes a separate
symmetric key to each of the ARs which are chosen from
a public list in advance. Once the ephemeral circuit is set
up, the interest is sent through the tunnels. The last part
from the exit AR to the content provider is the actual com-
munication as it is normally performed. After receiving the
content, the exit router encrypts the content, original name
and signature with the symmetric key. This ciphertext is
the content that he forwards to the entry AR. The content
and name are signed by the exit AR. The same happens at
the entry AR. When the user finally receives the content,
he has to decrypt it with the symmetric keys and verify the
producer’s signature.
The crucial point about anonymizing systems is that their
delays should be relatively small in order to still provide a
usable service. In their evaluation, DiBenedetto et al. [27]
show that ANDa¯NA outperforms Tor in the current Internet
for small files up to 10MB. Furthermore, the caching benefits
of Content Centric Networks are lost because of the encryp-
tion. ANDa¯NA does not provide solutions for most known
problems of Tor such as blocked relays and the distribution
of a list of relays.
6. RELATED WORK
Chaabane et al. [18] thoroughly describe challenges to pri-
vacy in Content Centric Networks. They divide privacy
threats into Cache, Content, Name and Signature Privacy
and discuss possible countermeasures. Their work provides
a great overview and starting point for further research on
the topic.
Lauinger [41] looks mainly at DoS- and Cache Privacy-related
problems of Content Centric Networking. His detailed anal-
ysis not only shows the weaknesses of the approach, but he
also provides a comprehensive discussion of potential solu-
tions.
Acs et al. [7] examine Cache Privacy for NDN in great detail.
They show how easy adversaries can find out about previ-
ously queried content and thus reconstruct a user’s commu-
nication. In order to overcome this issue, they propose sev-
eral countermeasures like delays and explicit privacy bits.
Similarly, Lauinger et al. [42] look at the effect of differ-
ent caching strategies on Cache Privacy. They also describe
how caches can enumerated by simply using functionality
provided by CCN.
Arianfar et al. [11] consider Content Centric Networks as a
step backwards in terms of privacy. To counter this, they
suggest mixing a censored file with a cover file to achieve
computational asymmetry. While this method does not pro-
vide guarantees, it increases the effort censors have to invest.
DiBenedetto et al. [27] propose ANDa¯NA, an onion routing
network designed as an overlay network to NDN. Similarly
to Tor, ANDa¯NA aims at providing anoymity to users by
relaying traffic and with layered encryption.
Ghali et al. [32] discuss content poisoning extensively. In
order to prevent this problem, they argue that content veri-
fication should be left to the communicating parties instead
of the routers. They propose small changes in the commu-
nications of NDN in order to establish trust management on
the network layer.
Xie et al. [56] propose CacheShield, a robust cache scheme
applicable to CCN. CacheShield tries to optimize perfor-
mance by caching only popular content. Their studies show
that CacheShield also helps to mitigate cache pollution at-
tacks. Teoli [50] evaluated CacheShield more extensively
and confirmed its effectiveness. Conti et al. [25] argue that
CacheShield requires too much storage space. As an alterna-
tive, they propose a lightweight mechanism for the detection
of cache pollution.
Ghali et al. [32] describe content poisoning in detail and
come up with a solution that involves trust management
on the network layer. Effectively, the introduce a so-called
Interest-Key-Binding (IKB) which happens when sending
the interest.
A lot of research groups have focused on the detection and
mitigation of Denial of Service attacks in Content Centric
Networks or Interest Flooding Attacks (IFA). Wa¨hlisch et
al. [52] analyze the problem space of attacking a CCN back-
bone, including an experimental study of different IFA sce-
narios in NDN. Gasti et al. [31] broadly discuss DoS and
DDoS attacks in NDN and suggest a number of mitigation
techniques. Compagno et al. [23] experimented with a coun-
termeasure based on router statistics. They show that even
under attack, they can achieve a forwarding percentage of
more than 80% of legitimate traffic. Ding et al. [28] de-
tect IFAs by using an entropy-based model. Dai et al. [26]
suggest using tracebacks in case of a suspected attack. By
using the PITs of routers, they manage to find the origins
of the attack and limit their access to the network by drop-
ping interests. Wang et al. [53] describe how attackers could
circumvent interest aggregation by requesting non-existent
content. As a countermeasure, they suggest a threshold-
based detection and mitigation scheme (TDM) that recog-
nizes when too many interests time out. As an alternative,
Wang et al. [54] propose Disabling PIT Exhaustion (DPE)
to reduce the effect of IFAs by directly recognizing mali-
cious requests before the PIT is full. Afanasyev et al.[8]
performed large-scale simulations to test the effectiveness of
several mitigation algorithms. Especially the satisfaction-
based pushback algorithm, which enforces a limit on the
number of forwarded interests based on an interface’s in-
terest satisfaction ratio, achieved promising results. Li et
al. [44] propose Interest Cash, a countermeasure against IFA
that mandates solving a puzzle before being allowed to send
interests. Their evaluations show that the an attacker needs
more than 300 times more resources than a publisher to
launch a successful IFA against him. Al-Sheikh et al. [9]
compare nine different countermeasures and discuss their
limitations in different network scenarios.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide an overview of how various as-
pects of security and privacy change with Content Centric
Networks. Even though security is a main design princi-
ple, the architecture allows for new attacks such as Interest
Flooding Attacks, Cache Pollution and Content Poisoning.
Furthermore, privacy is not taken into account which leads
to new problems categorized as Cache, Content, Name and
Signature Privacy. Overall, Content Centric Networking is
intended to be a scalable and efficient architecture. It is
neither completely beneficial nor completely detrimental for
security and privacy. Instead, some aspects were improved
while others offer new vulnerabilities. In general, we con-
clude that there is a tradeoff between the effectiveness of
caches and privacy. This implies a change of methods for
both attackers and defenders. In the current Internet, se-
curity was mainly built on top of the architecture. It re-
mains to be seen whether more security and privacy can be
added to Content Centric Networks. Considering that actual
projects like CCNx and NDN are still being improved and
changed, it is vital for researchers to find flaws and solutions
in the architecture now while changes are still possible.
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